On August 31, the US-listed fintech platform LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. (NASDAQ: LX) released its unaudited financial results for the second quarter of 2026. The report showed that, during the period, the company's overall net profit dropped sharply by nearly 80%, yet its installment e-commerce business bucked the trend with a 60% surge. Against the backdrop of the full implementation of new rules governing loan facilitation, tightening financial consumer protection regulations, and a fresh nationwide crackdown on predatory lending and coercive debt collection, the Fenqile mall—operated under Lexin's umbrella—has become embroiled in consumer disputes over bundled sales of Buy Ya supermarket cards, high-markup installment plans, and refund difficulties, once again exposing compliance risks lurking in its scenario-based installment operations.

Financial data reveals that in the second quarter of 2026, Lexin recorded total operating revenue of RMB 3.187 billion, down 11.2% year-over-year. Net profit attributable to ordinary shareholders stood at RMB 101 million, a steep decline of 80.2% from the prior year, while adjusted net profit came in at RMB 127 million, down 76.4%, marking a notable retreat in overall performance. The company attributed the sharp profit drop primarily to regulatory pressure that shrank the scale of loan facilitation, increased provisioning in line with prudent risk management principles, and a pace of cost reduction that failed to keep up with the revenue slide.

Looking at business segments, the core credit business continued to struggle. During the reporting period, credit facilitation service revenue fell 15% year-over-year to RMB 1.93 billion, while technology-enabled service revenue slid 43% to RMB 473 million. In stark contrast, the installment e-commerce segment posted rapid growth, with platform service revenue jumping 60.8% year-over-year to RMB 784 million, now serving as the company's key growth driver. According to the earnings report, the segment's GMV after returns reached RMB 2.342 billion in the second quarter, up 15.5%, with quarterly active users surpassing 700,000. The business operates mainly through the Buy Ya supermarket within the Fenqile app, offering daily goods, digital products, and virtual prepaid cards such as Buy Ya supermarket cards, JD E-cards, and Ctrip cards.

As the e-commerce business expands rapidly, the bundle installment model of Fenqile's Buy Ya supermarket has triggered a wave of consumer complaints. On the Black Cat complaint platform, Fenqile received over 2,200 complaints in the past month, including 129 specifically related to Buy Ya cards. These complaints largely center on forced bundling, inflated borrowing costs, refund difficulties, and high-markup schemes that amount to hidden upfront fees. Numerous users report that the platform forces them to purchase universal vouchers like JD E-cards and Ctrip cards together with Buy Ya supermarket cards, making it impossible to buy the general-purpose cards alone. The bundled packages carry significant premiums, and the overall installment costs are steep, leaving repayment burdens far exceeding the actual value of the goods. One user complained that in a RMB 3,000 card package, they were forced to accept a RMB 2,550 Buy Ya card, and with interest, the total repayment hit RMB 5,711—heavily inflating the repayment load. Another user stated they needed to return four Buy Ya cards totaling RMB 1,600 (RMB 400 each), noting, "First, my Buy Ya cards were never used—this is a bundled sale tied to the loan. Also, the prices of purchasable goods don't match real market rates, the markup is excessive, and it's essentially a disguised prepaid deduction with usurious interest."

Independent testing by this author found that the Fenqile app lists multiple card bundle packages. For example, a RMB 1,300 JD E-card set is offered as a fixed combination of a RMB 1,000 JD E-card plus a RMB 300 Buy Ya card, available only as a whole unit. Users can opt for 12-month installment repayment, with a total repayment of RMB 1,475.04, including RMB 175.04 in fees and a 24% annual service rate. Platform rules state that card packages are indivisible and do not support full refunds; unused Buy Ya cards can only be returned after the entire installment order is settled. Yet many users report that when attempting refunds, the platform deflects or outright refuses, making consumer recourse extremely difficult. Some users have gone as far as to say the model closely mirrors the bundling-and-high-interest lending scheme exposed by CCTV's 3.15 gala in 2024 involving Tongcheng Finance—a textbook case of scenario-based disguised lending.

In response to the swirling controversies over bundled sales, alleged predatory lending, and high markups, this author verified directly with Lexin. A company representative stated: "Buy Ya operates a supermarket with a rich category lineup. Buy Ya supermarket cards are not redeemable for cash, and there is no cash-out channel. I don't know the specifics of Tongcheng Finance, but as I recall, its biggest feature was that it allowed cash redemption." When pressed on the frequently cited complaint that JD E-cards are forcibly bundled with Buy Ya cards, Lexin declined to comment.

Before the Buy Ya controversy erupted, Fenqile had already drawn regulatory scrutiny. On March 13 of this year, the National Financial Regulatory Administration conducted a collective supervisory meeting with Fenqile and four other major loan facilitation platforms, explicitly demanding standardized financial marketing practices, full and transparent disclosure of borrowing rates and fees, strict personal information protection, compliant debt collection operations, and improved complaint-handling mechanisms to clamp down on consumer protection violations. Around the same time, in March 2026, the administration and the People's Bank of China jointly issued the Regulations on Transparent Disclosure of Comprehensive Financing Costs for Personal Loans, which took effect on August 1, 2026. The rules require all credit products to fully and transparently disclose annualized total costs, banning fee-splitting and hidden interest practices. Furthermore, on September 30, 2026, the Measures for the Online Marketing of Financial Products, jointly issued by eight departments, is set to take effect, explicitly prohibiting bundled sales, lending inducements, and deceptive marketing.

Notably, the latest national campaign to combat organized crime has now designated online predatory lending and coercive debt collection as key targets under the new crime-fighting push. According to the Ministry of Public Security's website, in August of this year, the ministry launched a centralized crackdown that dismantled over 1,000 criminal gangs and apprehended more than 8,200 suspects, with online predatory lending singled out as a priority. In Zhejiang Province, authorities busted a gang operating online predatory lending disguised as fake shopping and bundled product sales, offering short-term, high-interest loans under the banner of "buy now, pay later" to inflate debts for profit—109 people were arrested. This is a classic example of scenario-based predatory lending, where gangs use shopping malls and prepaid card transactions to package loans and fabricate fraudulent capital flows, posing the same risk profile as the high-markup scenario installments under regulatory scrutiny. Meanwhile, data released by the Supreme People's Procuratorate in September shows that prosecutors nationwide have intensified efforts against illegal practices in the online lending sector, approving arrests of 63 individuals involved in illegal collection activities linked to organized crime and prosecuting 25 others, with a focus on curbing coercive tactics such as leaking contacts, SMS bombing, doctored threatening photos, and harassing third parties.

Under this dual regulatory-judicial pressure, the entire chain of loan facilitation—including scenario installments, bundled marketing, and collection compliance—is now entering its most stringent rectification cycle. An industry insider who declined to be named noted that with the traditional loan facilitation business under sustained pressure, Lexin's pivot toward installment e-commerce and the Buy Ya supermarket as a second growth curve reflects a common industry transition path. However, with the full rollout of new lending rules, interest rate disclosure mandates, and financial marketing regulations, compounded by the ongoing crackdown on predatory lending and coercive collections, the crude expansion model that relies on bundled tie-ins and high-markup scenario arbitrage no longer has room to survive.